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4 Black Consciousness in contemporary  South African politics
Thiven Reddy
An ironic feature of contemporary South African politics is that while the 
organisations representing Black Consciousness (BC) ideas remain weak and 
fragmented, a revival in BC ideas, values and practices in official and civil 
society discourses seems evident. BC organisations dominated anti-apartheid 
politics in the 1970s, but their startling decline, particularly their weakened 
state under post-1994 democracy, calls out for analytical attention. In the 
1999 and 2004 elections, the Azanian People’s Organisation (Azapo) was the 
leading BC organisation. Together with the smaller Socialist Party of Azania 
(Sopa), Azapo received dismal support. Moreover, Azapo has split into three 
smaller organisations. Efforts to merge the three have so far faltered. One 
cannot conclude, however, that the obvious failure of BC political parties 
to challenge the ANC and the historically white political parties at the polls 
means that we should dismiss these organisations’ ideologies as ineffective 
and lacking in influence. The resurgence of BC ideas at the level of civil 
society, at a time when we might expect BC to be anachronistic, is intriguing. 
It is also the subject of this chapter.
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part discusses the BC 
movement and the legacy of Steve Biko. This discussion focuses on the 
establishment of Azapo and how, by the mid-1990s, it had weakened as an 
organisation. The second part of the chapter links the decline of Azapo’s 
fortunes to the specific ideological choices made by its leadership in the late 
1980s, and to Azapo’s failure to make the transition to the terrain of democratic 
electoral politics. The third part of the chapter shows how significant sections 
of post-apartheid society have accepted and/or appropriated BC ideas, despite 
its organisational collapse. Examples include some of Thabo Mbeki’s speeches 
and the proliferation of BC ideas in political and civil society among the black 
middle class and youth. I will attempt to spell out why this resurgence in BC 
ideas is taking place. I argue that the collapse of the BC movement is a result 






















of its rejection of the negotiations process and its marginalisation during the 
formative period of democratic society.
The argument for the resurgence of ideas associated with BC is premised 
on the ongoing conflicts over the distribution of power and resources that 
remained unresolved with the political settlement in 1994. The inadequacies 
of a ‘non-racial liberalism’, embraced in official and dominant discourses 
after 1994, do not resonate with the vast majority of South Africans, who 
experience, in the words of Biko, visibility but not ‘real participation’. The 
ever-faithful contradiction between the material conditions of life and the 
dominant ideology goes some way towards explaining the continuing search 
for alternative ways of addressing this problem. In this case, the alternative 
happens to be BC. The chapter concludes by reflecting on why BC remains 
relevant in contemporary South African life.
Biko’s legacy in contemporary black politics
The contemporary relevance and spread of BC ideas 30 years after Biko’s 
death calls us to reflect historically on the developments in struggle politics 
from the perspective of BC and its emergence. As a point of departure, we 
could divide the struggle in South Africa into the following periods: 
firstly, when BC emerged in 1967 up to the Soweto uprisings in 1976 and 
the banning of organisations in 1977; 
secondly, the re-emergence of the ANC as the dominant political force 
in the anti-apartheid struggle from the mid-1980s to the first democratic 
election; and
thirdly, the period after 1994, with the ANC dominating the political 
system.
In the mid-1970s a loose mosaic of civil society organisations – of women, 
workers, students and youth – oriented around community projects and 
political campaigns at local, regional and national levels. They were linked in 
various ways to one another, and they contributed to a renaissance in black 
civic and political culture. A culture of resistance began to take root. These 
new organisations, and some older established community organisations, 
embraced BC ideology. The surprising proliferation of BC ideas in township 
communities, and the consequent resurgence of black political consciousness, 
encouraged the South African Students’ Organisation (Saso), the founding 
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BC organisation, to initiate a political organisation called the Black People’s 
Convention (BPC). The aim of this organisation was to give direction to, 
and consolidate the various strands of, these civil society organisations 
into a political movement. Despite the repressive political environment, 
the BPC challenged the structures of power in society in its preamble and 
attacked the apartheid system. It aimed to unite all oppressed people into a 
political movement to liberate black people from psychological and physical 
oppression. The BPC saw itself as a movement of black people, rejecting 
any form of tribal affiliation and ethnic mobilisation and identifying with 
a global anti-racist struggle. When the students of Soweto revolted against 
the imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in schools, they 
demonstrated a new assertiveness that came with the cultural context of 
protest among black communities.
In the immediate aftermath of the Soweto uprisings, BC activists who were 
not banned, detained or in exile formed Azapo. We can divide BC as it relates 
to Azapo into the following five phases: 
the period of the ‘united front’ when ANC and Africanist groups worked 
within Azapo, from 1978 to 1980;
the period from 1981 to 1983, with its emphasis on the socialist 
characteristics of BC and the outcome of ideological debate on the 
relationship between the national and social questions;
the period from 1984 to 1985, when Azapo and the United Democratic 
Front (UDF) engaged in opposition campaigns against the Botha 
reforms;
the period from 1986 to 1988, when Azapo adopted a rigid ‘scientific 
socialist’ approach, viewing itself as a vanguard party of the black 
working class; and
the period from 1990 to the present, characterised by internal 
fragmentation, uncertainty and poor voter support in democratic 
elections.
The recurring theme of BC’s relevance came up as expected at the inaugural 
congress of Azapo. The delegates addressed the question of BC’s relevance 
in the period after the Soweto revolt. The congress celebrated the enormous 
impact of the Soweto revolt on resistance politics, maintaining that BC 
inspired the initial political awareness that led to Soweto but that it had to 
adapt to the changing socio-political conditions. These changing conditions 
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were the anticipated ‘reforms’ called for by key members of the political 
and economic elite. They emphasised that BC was a dynamic ideology of 
the oppressed, able to respond creatively to changing contexts. Responding 
to the mass fear and inactivity of the 1970s, BC stressed ‘psychological 
emancipation’ as a condition for mass mobilisation. In the aftermath of the 
1976 revolt, BC had to challenge the entire socio-economic system (read racial 
capitalism) supporting white supremacy, especially when the system planned 
to move away from the more overt forms of racism. Azapo affirmed that it 
would concentrate on black workers and that the trade unions would be the 
organisational link to the black working class. 
During the township revolts from 1983 onwards and the state of emergency 
that followed, Azapo moved closer to an uncomplicated Marxist position 
embracing ‘scientific socialism’ and committing itself to ‘the leadership of 
the black working class’. The National Forum Summit in 1984 and the Azapo 
Council in Houtbosdorp in May 1985 extensively discussed the theory behind 
scientific socialism and how it related to the formative ideas of BC. In keeping 
with the radicalised political context sweeping through the urban townships, 
some delegates proposed workers’ councils as alternatives to state structures, 
similar to the dual power system of pre-revolutionary Russia. The model of 
revolutionary insurrection of the masses and the successful seizure of state 
power in some kind of frontal assault dominated the imagery permeating 
party discourse. 
There are two main views about the relationship between the periods before 
and after the Soweto uprisings. The first view is held by those who see 
themselves as upholding the authentic, unbroken tradition of BC. This view 
is critical of non-BC formations, especially of the ANC. Those who hold this 
view argue for an independent, dominant BC tradition embracing the best of 
previous resistance traditions and formations in the history of the struggle. 
This view pinned itself on what it considered to be the unique analysis of 
apartheid racism, the different strategy and the vision of a South African 
society after apartheid that BC and Biko represented. The second view, 
popular among many activists who joined the ANC, argues that BC played 
an important but limited role within the broader struggle led by the ANC. 
Once the ANC again assumed prominence from the 1980s, BC ought to have 
subordinated itself to the leadership of the ANC and embraced its tradition 
of non-racialism and the mobilisation of people around community issues 
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and the Freedom Charter. According to this view, non-racialism and mass 
mobilisation amounted to an advance on BC ideology and those who refused 
to make this important change and adapt to the new and different conditions 
displayed an unrealistic, hardline position that was difficult to justify. The 
weakened state of BC organisations proves that BC is a spent force and the 
correctness of ANC analysis.
After the post-Soweto state clampdown BC continued to be openly criticised, 
mainly from ANC quarters, for its emphasis on black power as opposed to the 
non-racial emphasis of the Freedom Charter. The ANC accused it of reverse 
racism and narrow nationalism, arguing that the fight against apartheid should 
in its practice resemble the society to be and that a progressive nationalism did 
not define participation on the basis of racial identities. Further, BC ideology 
inadequately theorised class exploitation and did not draw on class analysis. 
It reflected the interests and frustrations of the educated black elite who did 
not want to overthrow apartheid radically and build a society that addressed 
the interests of the working class (Hirson 1979; Lodge 1983). The ANC, by 
contrast, in its alliance with the South African Communist Party (SACP), saw 
itself as representing this more radical critique.
It is common sense to associate the period in which BC emerged with the 
figure of Steven Bantu Biko. Biko’s unique role as the leader of the liberation 
struggle of the 1970s is generally acknowledged. The importance of this period 
in producing the turning point in the anti-apartheid struggle – the mass youth 
uprisings of Soweto – is also widely recognised. Biko occupies a special place 
among South African struggle heroes. He was a founding member of the BC 
movement. He was brutally killed by the security police and the international 
outcry that followed placed South Africa’s apartheid policies firmly on the 
international agenda. The range, style and analytical power of his writings 
reflected, at the height of apartheid, the anger, frustrations and aspirations 
of a generation of young black people. In contemporary politics, and in the 
broader context of the transformative agenda of a democratic political system, 
debate surrounds the place of Biko and BC after Biko’s death (Badat 1999; 
Halisi 1999; Lodge 1983).
Directly related to the post-1979 divisions is the more emotive dispute 
concerning where Biko would have situated himself politically in contemporary 
South African politics. Would he have abandoned old-style BC and joined the 
ANC as other key leaders of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) did? 
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Would he have distanced himself from the ANC? Or, given his enormous 
organising capacities and intellectual analysis, would he have led the BCM 
to greater heights, where it would not have been a mere shadow of the ANC? 
Unsurprisingly, those aligned with Azapo and Sopa believe that Biko would 
not have abandoned BC to join the ANC (Nkadimeng cited in The Star 
12.09.05). Some say this question is irrelevant and raises another red herring 
by those who left BC for the ANC. To them, it is impossible to know where 
Biko would have stood, because BC was always about more than the views 
of a few individuals and leaders, including Biko. The key question of a truly 
revolutionary project is the ideology, strategy and tactics that realise the 
aspirations of the vast majority in the society. The elements for a revolutionary 
project can only come from within the BC tradition. The core of this dispute 
lies in how we interpret Biko’s texts in relation to the BC organisations 
established before and after his death (Gerhart 1978; Gibson 1988).
The main criticisms of BC fail to appreciate the context in which BC 
emerged and operated, and largely ignore what was needed to create a 
culture of resistance in the 1970s. At the first ‘formation school’, held 
at the Natal University Medical School in December 1969, Biko talked 
about the significance, role and future of Saso (Stubbs 1978). Biko relates 
Saso’s establishment to the post-Sharpeville failures of black resistance: 
the pervasiveness of ethnic and tribal disunity, the consequent need for a 
cementing ideology, and the need to respond to the problem of weak black 
leadership in the face of a dominant white liberalism. The National Union of 
South African Students was structurally unable to facilitate black interests. The 
situation in which black students found themselves made it necessary to form 
an organisation representing their own interests without depending on white-
dominated organisations. Establishing an independent black organisation 
did not translate into support for the government’s racial policy; rather, in 
the context of the period, it was a realistic response to fight the system: ‘what 
SASO has done is simply to take stock of the present scene in the country and 
to realise that not unless the non-white students decide to lift themselves from 
the doldrums will they ever hope to get out of them. What we want is not black 
visibility but real black participation’ (Stubbs 1978: 5; emphasis added).
The initial task that BC adherents aimed at was the creation of a politically 
conscious subject of change after a decade of fear and apathy. They sought 
also to avoid the constant infighting that had characterised the activities 
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of the student bodies, the African Students’ Association and the African 
Students’ Union of South Africa, in the early 1960s. The immediate situation 
Saso experienced sparked the practical activities it chose, and inevitably these 
activities encouraged black self-assertiveness. This produced a political subject 
willing to engage in collective action. This was the aim of black students. They 
came from communities experiencing the brunt of apartheid racism. They 
were driven by the state into new higher education institutions, the so-called 
bush colleges. These were oppressive institutions consciously designed to 
produce passive elites willing to administer the bantustan project and buy into 
possible grand-apartheid ‘reforms’. This student generation faced, in the post-
Sharpeville period, a lull in black resistance politics – the exiled organisations 
were barely visible due to effective state repression of overt resistance activity. 
In addition, having established bases a great distance from South Africa’s 
borders, the exiled organisations found themselves without easy access to 
a mass base inside South Africa. The influence of white liberal politics and 
bantustan political elites took centre stage in claiming to lead the resistance to 
apartheid (Mzamane et al. 2006).
The emphasis on culture and ideology that is meaningful to participants 
fighting systematic white racism and a white power structure is the BC’s 
significant contribution to South African political discourse. The key BC 
elements of the pre-1979 period are succinctly summarised by Fatton. The 
students formed an ‘ethico-political ideology capable of liberating blacks from 
their own mental submissiveness to white cultural hegemony’ (Fatton 1986: 
69). Part of BC’s innovative character under South African conditions was that 
it set out to provide ‘a radical critique of the pretensions and aims of white 
liberalism’ (Fatton 1986: 70). While elements of white liberalism (as opposed 
to the overt racism reflected in apartheid) had always caught the critical 
attention of individual black leaders, it had not been systematically critiqued 
as a particular mode of politics in South Africa, nor put under the spotlight 
of a full-frontal assault. Finally, the emphasis was on the solidarity of the 
oppressed people as a means to end racism and its legacies (Fatton 1986). The 
definition of ‘black’ as a socially exploited group introduced a new political 
and constructivist dimension to identity politics, explicitly not grounded in 
an essentialist primordial understanding (Moodley 1982). In fact, the latter 
was vehemently opposed. The radical change of material conditions, as argued 
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in Biko’s ‘Quest for a True Humanity’ article, would undermine dominant 
notions of both white and black identities.
That BC lacked a comprehensive class analysis is unconvincing criticism and 
more accurately reflects the cut and thrust of political competition between 
rival ideologies in the anti-apartheid struggle. Fatton (1986) dismisses this 
criticism, arguing that any viewpoint that sets out to transform society 
radically can only offer a vague description of the future revolutionised 
society. BC was no exception, vaguely describing the future society as 
majoritarian and socialist. Fatton goes on to say that ‘Black Consciousness 
was not a theory of the future. Its task was not to describe the classless society 
of tomorrow, but to ruthlessly criticize the existing white racist order in all its 
institutional manifestations with the hope of contributing to the rise of black 
hegemony, and black dignity’ (1986: 78).
The formidable attack from the left that Azapo faced from elements in the 
SACP, the ANC and the Unity Movement in the early 1980s, and the post-
Soweto intellectual influences among activists inside and outside the country, 
influenced Azapo to frame BC increasingly within the lens of a particular kind 
of Marxism–Leninism, narrowing its identity to the fight for a socialist Azania 
(Murray 1987). The Leninist turn represents too sharp a diversion from the 
pre-1977 BC. The formative ideology, according to Gibson, was strongly 
influenced by Fanon’s existentialism and Marx’s humanism:
By the end of 1987 it seemed that Black Consciousness as seen 
through AZAPO is something radically different from its origins. 
As an idea originally situated in the subjectivity of the oppressed, 
which refused to comply with narrow ‘Marxist’ applications, it is 
now merely the projection of another Marxist-Leninist tendency. 
Black is the substance rather than the subject of revolution, the 
‘phenomena’ of material conditions. (Gibson 1988: 19)
Two essential elements of Biko’s BC were the way he theorised the concepts of 
leadership and the power of ideas (consciousness of the masses). The notion 
of the single party adopted by Azapo flies in the face of Fanon: ‘The single 
party is the modern form of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, unmasked, 
unpainted, unscrupulous and cynical…The party leaders behave like common 
sergeant-majors, frequently reminding the people of the need for “silence in 
the ranks” ’ (Gibson 1988: 22). 
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The rich political–cultural critique produced by Biko of the many 
manifestations of white supremacy (in both its conservative Afrikaner 
nationalist and white liberal frames), and its devastating psychological effects 
in the daily lives of black people, was somehow mechanistically absorbed and 
assumed in the scientific socialism of Azapo and its emphasis on class and 
capitalism. Undoubtedly, these structural notions had a basis in the earlier 
framework. However, they were not presented as the exclusive concerns to 
which everything else could be reduced. The ideological choices made in 
the 1980s have had consequences for the approach adopted towards the 
democratic transition. 
The key ideas of cultural expression, black solidarity and psychological 
liberation – all things necessary (political, economic, social–psychological) 
to create a fighting political subject, to reflect ‘a way of life; an attitude of 
mind’ and to ‘infuse the black man with pride and dignity’ – are absent from 
Azapo’s discourse of BC (Pityana et al. 1991: 1–12). It is the earlier values 
demanding ‘real black participation’ rather than mere ‘visibility’ that have 
resonated most with the expanding black middle class, as this middle class 
interacts in institutions and spaces dominated by white society in pre-1994 
South Africa. Whether Biko would have followed his closest comrades along 
the path of Azapo is an open question. Presumably, even Azapo would have 
been a different organisation, to the extent that some of the debates of today 
may simply have fallen away.
Azapo and the transition to multiparty democracy
During the late 1980s, the apartheid system experienced a crisis of social 
control. This took the form of growing resistance, a general breakdown 
in social order, lower productivity and profit rates, and increased 
unemployment, which the existing political–economic order was unable 
to resolve (Price 1990). The National Party (NP), under pressure from the 
broader Afrikaner and capitalist elite, proposed negotiations with its long-
standing enemies. The ANC became the government’s main negotiating 
partner, whereas Azapo immediately refused to participate in the various 
stages of the negotiations process. The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) later 
refused to participate as well. The negotiations process included the ‘talks 
about talks’, Codesa I and II and, finally, the multiparty negotiating forums 
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(Friedman & Atkinson 1994; Waldmier 1997). Inspired by the Zimbabwean 
model, Azapo and the PAC wanted the ANC to join them in a Patriotic 
Front. This would increase the liberation forces’ bargaining power, allowing 
them to demand from the government a set of minimum conditions. Azapo 
consistently demanded international mediation and a constituent assembly 
of democratically elected representatives of the people. The idea of a national 
convention such as Codesa (Convention for a Democratic South Africa) 
was rejected during the 1982 Azapo congress. Such a convention would 
include discredited ethnic and bantustan organisations that had collaborated 
with the apartheid regime, and was viewed as a sell-out to goals of radical 
transformation.
The ANC initially considered the Patriotic Front idea. It eventually rejected 
the conditions, however, and the approach to negotiations expected of it by 
much weaker organisations. It decided instead to proceed without the support 
of Azapo and the PAC. As a result of the sufficient consensus mechanism, 
whereby agreement between the ANC and the NP constituted approval, a series 
of compromising agreements produced a negotiated settlement. After many 
unpredictable setbacks and general uncertainty, a democratic Constitution 
was agreed to in early 1994. The negotiated outcome incorporated black voting 
rights in exchange for a complex system of checks and balances, the protection 
of private property rights, the cultural recognition of minorities, as well as 
promises by the ANC to form a coalition government for the first five years and 
not to replace the white civil service after the first election (Sisk 1995).
The PAC and Azapo failed to influence the main actors – the ANC and 
the NP – during the negotiations process. They quickly condemned the 
ANC for the compromised outcomes. Consequently, they could not lay 
claim to any of the successes or the global acceptance and legitimacy of 
the final Constitution. In the elections that followed, both the PAC and 
Azapo performed dreadfully, with results that were far below expectations. 
Azapo boycotted the first elections in 1994. This placed its supporters in the 
unenviable position of almost withdrawing from the political arena just as 
the country was experiencing its most historic moment. Azapo’s stance meant 
that it was going against the mass of citizens, including the black working 
class that the organisation claimed to represent. Azapo participated in the 
1999 and 2004 national elections and the 2000 local government elections. 
In 1999, Azapo received 0.17 per cent of the vote, or 27 257 votes. In 2004, it 





















S TAT E  O F  T H E  N AT I O N  2 0 0 8
94
received 0.25 per cent, or 39 116 votes, a slight increase. The breakaway Sopa 
received just 0.1 per cent of the national vote, or 14 853 votes. By contrast, 
in 1994, 1999 and 2004 the ANC won resounding victories with around 
10 million voters, stampeding over its opposition. Fewer eligible voters went 
to the polls in each consecutive election, however. In 1994, the ANC won 
62.6 per cent of the vote, ranking a full 42.0 per cent ahead of its nearest rivals. 
In 1999, it increased this to 66.5 per cent, winning another 14 seats to control 
266 seats. In 2004, it won a further 4 seats, bringing the number of seats in its 
control to 279 of the 400-seat National Assembly legislature.
A further disappointment for BC supporters was the increasing fragmentation 
of Azapo. Two breakaway groups resulted, splitting the BC vote and creating 
an impression of disarray and organisational weakness. Sopa was formed in 
1998 and the Black Consciousness Forum (BCF) was established in 2002. 
The latter was led by Nkosi Molala. Disputes over participation in the ANC 
government, relations with other political parties, and personality and 
factional differences are the most common reasons cited for the fragmentation 
of Azapo. Numerous attempts have been made to unite Azapo, the Sopa, the 
BCF and the PAC to create a radical black party to the left of the ANC, but 
these have proven fruitless so far.
Recurring internal conflicts, factional disputes and splits are manifestations of 
a weak institution. The inability to accommodate factional differences and to 
prevent personality differences from manifesting as splits in the organisation 
are key indicators suggesting a deeper malaise in the BC movement. The 
different political terrain of multiparty competition seems to highlight 
Azapo’s institutional weaknesses even further. Azapo lacks the characteristics 
of adaptability, coherence, complexity and autonomy that are essential to 
effectively making the transition from liberation movement to political party 
in a democracy. Aside from the ANC, the parties involved in the liberation 
struggle were unable to adapt to the new political terrain and to maintain 
their original coherence. Even the ANC appears to be faced with leadership 
selection crises and difficulties with reproducing the high moral values 
associated with the struggle among its members.
Several additional and interacting factors from the mid-1980s onwards 
account for the decline of BC organisations and their influence in the broader 
society. In retrospect, an important factor is Azapo’s emphasis on mass 
mobilisation based on ideology from the anti-apartheid struggle, instead 
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of focusing on community issues as the UDF did in the 1980s. The latter 
approach proved so much more successful in mobilising large numbers of 
people. Azapo wanted to strike an appropriate balance between aspects of 
community life that people wanted to fight against and change, and BC ideas. 
However, in its ideological disputes with the ANC/UDF, it was compelled to 
emphasise ideological issues. Azapo often had to defend BC against attacks of 
irrelevance, of lacking a class analysis, of charges of  ‘reverse racism’ and of 
merely representing elitist interests by demonstrating the unique capacity of 
BC to critique and radically change established social relations. 
When FW de Klerk started negotiations to change the terrain of conflict, 
Azapo was unable to develop a strategy that kept it in touch with the vast 
majority of citizens. Through rejecting negotiations on principle in its 
internal debates, its position came across as ambivalent, or as unrealistic and 
hardline. The refusal to engage in key forums during the negotiations process 
was quite understandable in the revolutionary context of the 1980s. When the 
ANC decided to enter into negotiations with the government, the situation 
had changed so dramatically that any anti-negotiations position merely 
marginalised Azapo from the historic, far-reaching changes in the political 
terrain. The strategy advocating the seizure of state power, appealing as this 
was during the heady days of mass struggle and independent community 
organisation, was unachievable once the negotiations process began. The ANC 
mobilised its support base in relation to the logic of the negotiations process. 
Azapo simply did not anticipate that the mass of South Africans considered the 
negotiations legitimate. This was partly due to its conception of revolution in 
absolute terms. To Azapo, total victory needed to occur without negotiations. 
Any mention of the latter conjured up ideas of compromise and defeat.
The overwhelming electoral support for the ANC goes some way towards 
explaining Azapo’s inability to adapt to multiparty democracy, both in the 
activity of elections and in the cut and thrust of arguing for and making 
policy. In a typically cyclical fashion, this continued lack of support and 
internal rejuvenation produced increasing ideological rigidity, perceived 
irresolvable conflicts among the organisation’s leadership and eventual 
fragmentation. Finally, the electoral campaigns, uncharismatic leadership and 
insufficient funding have not helped to reverse the dismal tide. Many left-wing 
socialist parties participate in South African elections, but Azapo presents 
no distinctive identity, aside from a historical one for older voters who may 
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vote for it out of nostalgia. To focus exclusively on the socialist project is 
too narrow a focus compared with the broad BC viewpoint to articulate ‘the 
way of life, and attitude of mind’ of the rich and multifaceted experience of 
historically oppressed subjects. New and innovative ways have to be fashioned 
to intervene creatively in contemporary democratic politics and to produce, 
from the disoriented subalterns, agents of radical change.
The resurgence of BC ideas in state, political and  
civil society after 1994
A distinctive characteristic of BC arising from its origins in the late 1960s is 
that many diverse organisations represented an eclectic range of BC ideas. 
The impotence of Azapo or Sopa cannot be translated into the death of the 
BC ideology. This is abundantly evident in its increasing recognition in the 
contemporary discourse of politics and change. The figure and memory of 
Biko is ever more popular and his ideas have found resonance in contemporary 
South African society, especially among the black middle class and youth.
In the post-1994 democratic period we witness, as expected, a significant 
change in political culture. Where unrealised expectations of black 
empowerment are evident, we see black frustrations rise. We witness 
strident responses from many sources, but those from within the white 
liberal paradigm appear to be the most significant, criticising the ANC and 
the government for failing in the areas of policy implementation and state 
efficiency. Despite its electoral popularity, the ANC, in this context, has failed 
to present an alternative discourse of rule and change to a dominant non-
racial liberalism. This has resulted in disaffected elements of civil society. For 
example, the black middle class is frustrated with the continuing dominance 
of white culture and the black working class is unhappy with service delivery. 
These groups are discovering in BC ideas the seeds of a more effective and 
satisfying response. While at the organisational level support for BC could not 
possibly get any lower, at the general societal level there has been a resurgence 
of BC ideas. Some could be considered conservative, whereas others are 
progressive and radical.
Faced with an onslaught of media criticism for his leadership style as 
president of South Africa, even Thabo Mbeki chose to draw on ideas that can 
be traced to the Biko era to respond to what he viewed as a media controlled 
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by white liberals and conservative Afrikaner elements. He incorporated a 
range of BC and Africanist ideas into his eclectic range of political speeches 
and writings. He also spearheaded an African Renaissance, calling for the 
rapid and immediate economic development of the continent, albeit largely 
within existing global relationship patterns of exchange. Aspects of this 
programme resonate with ideas associated with BC and Africanism – such 
as the long-standing pan-Africanist campaign for continental unity, a respect 
for and resurgence of African history, cultural values and practices, and ways 
of critically challenging the history of Africa’s marginalisation. Moreover, 
in introducing particular policies that directly attack legacies of apartheid, 
the Mbeki government justified these policies in terms that BC supporters 
found familiar, even though the terms may have lacked Biko’s complex and 
subtle arguments. In doing this, Mbeki aimed to narrow or overcome the gap 
between ‘two nations’.
Given Mbeki’s determined critiques of BC during his years in exile, his ‘I am 
an African’ speech at the opening of Parliament in 1996, and his ‘Two Nations’ 
address to the same institution in 1998, demonstrate striking and unexpected 
overtones of BC. Mbeki adopted an interesting position on the politics of 
identity in his ‘I am an African’ speech (cited in Mbeki 1998). He emphasised, 
in his typically poetic way, that his definition of ‘African’ consisted of all the 
various cultures and significant experiences and events that divide South 
African society historically. To be African means to be made from multiple 
cultures and pasts. He proposed Africanness as a unifying identity, the 
composition of which involves the contributions of all who make up South 
African society, but which, importantly, sees the history of injustice and the 
struggle for liberation as essential to its meaning. For Mbeki (1998: 32), ‘being 
part of all of these people’ constitutes an African identity. He concluded that 
because of these experiences, a South African, African nation already exists, if 
it will only recognise that of which it already consists. 
This strange combination of multicultural and post-structural elements in the 
African nation contributes to our understanding, but also introduces tensions. 
Mbeki’s general notion of a renaissance in Africa involving development on all 
fronts – cultural, economic and political – lends itself, as argued by Chipkin 
(2007), to a reading of the concept of African in biologically essentialist 
ways.
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Two years after this speech, frustrated and disappointed with the pace of 
change and the reluctance of privileged white sectors to embrace ANC 
initiatives, Mbeki focused on the continuing inequalities between white and 
black people. He criticised white society for failing to appreciate the legacy 
and role of apartheid policies in contributing to their material privilege. 
While reiterating sentiments contained in the concept of ‘colonialism of a 
special type’, he seemed also to draw on common-sense sentiments associated 
with BC ideas as framed by Biko. He pointed to the limitations of bourgeois 
democracy under South Africa’s racially divided social structure:
We therefore make bold to say that South Africa is a country of 
two nations. One of these nations is white, relatively prosperous, 
regardless of gender or geographic dispersal. It has ready access 
to a developed economic, physical, educational, communication 
and other infrastructure. This enables it to argue that, except for 
the persistence of gender discrimination against women, all mem-
bers of this nation have the possibility to exercise their right to 
equal opportunity, the development opportunities to which the 
Constitution of ’93 committed our country. The second and larger 
nation of South Africa is black and poor, with the worst affected 
being women in the rural areas, the black rural population in 
general and the disabled. This nation lives under conditions of 
a grossly underdeveloped economic, physical, educational, com-
munication and other infrastructure. It has virtually no possibility 
to exercise what in reality amounts to a theoretical right to equal 
opportunity, with that right being equal within this black nation 
only to the extent that it is equally incapable of realisation. This 
reality of two nations, underwritten by the perpetuation of the 
racial, gender and spatial disparities born of a very long period of 
colonial and apartheid white minority domination, constitutes the 
material base which reinforces the notion that, indeed, we are not 
one nation, but two nations. And neither are we becoming one 
nation. Consequently, also, the objective of national reconciliation 
is not being realised. (Mbeki 1998: 72)
Mbeki’s language won him sympathetic support from some in Azapo, changing 
dramatically the adversarial relationship between Azapo and the ANC. In 2005, 
the publicity secretary of Azapo, Don Nkadimeng, wrote that ‘when President 
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Thabo Mbeki speaks of two nations in one country, he is speaking of Black 
Consciousness, and, therefore of Steve Biko’ (The Star 12.09.05). The Mbeki 
government, on the practical political front, incorporated Azapo into the ruling 
Cabinet coalition. The leader of Azapo, Mosibudi Mangena, was appointed a 
deputy minister in 1999 and a full minister in 2004. Other key Azapo members, 
such as Mojanku Gumbi and Itumeleng Mosala, served in crucial and senior 
posts in the Mbeki government. This indicates a significant break from the 
hostile relations between Azapo and the ANC that prevailed just a decade ago.
At the national level, this co-operation is purely academic. The ANC’s 
unassailable electoral support and dominance of the political system does 
not require it to seek the support of any other party to govern. However, at 
local and regional levels of government, the trend towards party coalitions 
seems likely to continue. At these levels of government, the ANC will benefit 
from co-operative relations with parties it views as like-minded. Parties 
with similar struggle histories might work together in forming governing 
coalitions. It is equally salient that in existing governing coalitions – such as 
the ones governing the City of Cape Town or Beaufort West – party ideologies 
and histories count for very little. The almost unbelievable coalition formed 
around the Democratic Alliance (DA) in the City of Cape Town includes six 
parties from diverse and antagonistic historical and ideological backgrounds. 
Who could have predicted a coalition government of the DA and the 
PAC? Does this suggest that history and ideology may not be important 
determinants of party choices in the future? Will parties act purely out of 
instrumental interests? We will have to wait for a situation involving Azapo to 
arise to see whether this softening of past ideology prevails to the extent that 
it would join DA-headed coalitions.
The more interesting and direct influence of BC expresses itself in civil society. 
This is important because it is at odds with party affiliation, electoral behaviour 
and dominant discourse. It is common to see young people wearing Steve 
Biko t-shirts. This would have been quite unthinkable in the 1980s, unless one 
was a card-carrying member of Azapo, so entrenched was individual identity 
in political party affiliation. The intense intolerance between parties in that 
period made it thoroughly insecure for a party member to be found in the 
wrong place at the wrong time (Murray 1987). Nowadays, no one assumes 
that by wearing a Biko t-shirt a person is declaring himself or herself an 
Azapo supporter, or even that the person has any knowledge of BC. At the 
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very minimum, it would indicate a superficial identification with a broad 
conception of BC. Granted, these expressions do not indicate the degree (if 
at all) to which people embrace BC ideas or the extent of their awareness 
of BC ideology. They do, nevertheless, suggest some kind of identification. 
In early 2002, two of the leading popular and competing radio stations in 
Johannesburg, Radio Metro and YFM, released advertising campaigns to 
woo listeners. Both stations serve largely black youth constituencies. The 
station manager of Radio Metro indicated that the ads were part of the ‘What 
makes you black’ campaign – a familiar theme of the BC movement in the 
early 1970s.
The prominence of the Steve Biko Lecture and other forums that take place 
throughout the country to commemorate Biko is a new and surprising 
development. Since its formation, Azapo has commemorated Biko Week, but 
the events during this week were ignored by the UDF and ANC supporters 
during the 1980s. Media coverage was also often poor and disappointing. This 
has changed – now, many organisations not directly associated with Azapo or 
Sopa remember Biko in a variety of ways. 
The Steve Biko Lecture, hosted by the University of Cape Town and the Steve 
Biko Foundation, is now in its sixth year. Organisers of the lecture have invited 
political heavyweights such as Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu as keynote 
speakers. In addition, internationally recognised African writers such as Ngugi 
wa Thiongo and Chinua Achebe spoke at this event, which is attended by large 
audiences and receives extensive national TV coverage. In each of the six years, 
speakers have reiterated the relevance of BC in contemporary South Africa. 
Even Mandela, initially a harsh critic of BC during Robben Island debates in 
the 1970s and while leader of the ANC during the height of violent clashes in 
the early 1980s between the two traditions, now points out the importance of 
an ideology of black pride, assertiveness and self-reliance.
What accounts for this resurgence of BC ideas? In South Africa, where 
negotiations produced a constitutional political settlement that left the 
broader socio-economic capitalist and cultural context relatively intact, 
unresolved issues play themselves out in a kind of trench warfare. This battle is 
fought in varied and multiple conflicts on a daily basis. Many of these conflicts 
take complex class–race expressions, especially where the class–race overlap 
has not been significantly dented. These conflicts take multiple forms, such as 
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challenges to different government policies, selection of sports team members, 
different interpretations of public practices, and ongoing debates about where 
responsibility lies for the unaddressed and ongoing patterns that apartheid 
has left behind. Many more examples can be cited, drawing on a general 
glance at letters to daily newspapers or from radio discussions on national and 
local stations in which citizens articulate their views. 
These engagements by ordinary citizens resemble what Scott (1985: 1) refers 
to as ‘small arms fire’ in an ongoing battle for hegemony between dominant 
and subaltern discourses. Differences between white and black perceptions 
abound, although a small number who refuse to sit comfortably in either of 
these groups also exists, and will perhaps grow with time.
An integral part of these disputes involves the continuing dominance of 
Eurocentric values in post-apartheid South Africa, where the majority believes 
that, in the democratic political system, its will ought to hold. Arguably, this 
applies to the political world, but relations of domination have not been 
settled in any other important sphere of the social formation. The dominant 
culture – in the media, advertising, economics, art – tends to reflect the 
relations of dominance inherited under apartheid, with white society still 
controlling the various levers of economic power.
More controversially, white liberal discourses have been successful in drawing 
on and surreptitiously claiming to be custodians of the west, where the 
latter notion has been used as the standard against which all things in Africa 
and South Africa under a black government are judged. The non-racial 
liberalism of the ANC, which the DA and the dominant English-speaking 
establishment tend to appropriate, makes the ANC increasingly insensitive 
to having continuously to prove its liberal democratic credentials to quarters 
whose commitment to a democratic majoritarian South Africa it considers 
questionable. 
The growth in social inequality, especially the marginalisation of the poor, 
and the strengthened discourses embracing liberal individualism, market 
mechanisms and capitalism, have all increased the relevance of Biko’s ideas. 
At times, therefore, ANC leaders and the emerging black middle class find 
drawing on BC and Africanist ideas appealing, as well as historically valid.
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Conclusion
To determine why BC resonates in the democratic period, recall Bishop Tutu’s 
(2006) words: ‘I have often said that Black Consciousness did not finish the 
work it had set out to do.’ The significance of BC ideas and practices remains 
valid in South African society, not least of all because the quest for self-worth 
and dignity is directly related to the unequal material conditions of life – 
conditions that specifically made notions of whiteness and blackness seem 
like common sense. As long as the conditions that produced racial identities 
in South Africa prevail, the ideas of black assertiveness, black pride and the 
quest for dignity remain relevant.
Biko contended that BC was not a one-off, tap-like mechanism, but a 
continuous process of contestation and assertiveness and that this process, 
both internal and external to the individual, would eventually make itself 
unnecessary. It will simply lose its relevance and fall away. The grinding 
poverty that Biko wrote about, and its devastating effects on black life and 
culture, has worsened, or is perceived to have worsened. This accounts for the 
increase in violence within black communities and makes BC increasingly 
necessary if the true humanity of apartheid’s victims is to be realised.
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